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Transport costs in address models of differentiation are usually modeled
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1 Introduction.
Transportation is an essential element in the modeling of address models of differ-
entiation. Two common assumptions in this regard are (i) the separability between
the demand of the consumption good and of transportation services, and (ii) a con-
stant transport cost function.
Such an approach can be challenged on two grounds. On the one hand, in
many sectors of an economy we find an oligopolistic structure in the market of
transportation services; on the other hand, there are sectors in the economy where
transport costs are dependent on the demand (i.e. price) of the consumption good
transported. Such is the case for instance, in the supply of electricity and of water.
In both cases, there is a difference (loss) between the amount delivered at the point
of production and the amount received at the point of consumption. Such loss de-
pends (among other factors) of the geographical distance between producers and
consumers. Several interpretations can be put forward. We can think of this phe-
nomenon as a loss of quality, or, in a temporal interpretation, as a lag between the
buying of the commodity and its consumption.
The approach we propose to tackle this issue has been extensively used in
other domains of research, such as urban economics (see e.g. Fujita, 1995, Abdel-
Raman, 1994, Abdel-Rahman and Anas, 2004) or in general equilibrium mod-
els of international trade (see e.g. Krugman, 1991a,b, 1992, Helpman and Krug-
man, 1988). Curiously enough, in those areas the way to cope with the difference
between the amount of good delivered and consumed has been different. There,
transport costs are formulated in terms of the transported commodity. This model-
ing was formalized by Samuelson (1954, 1983) as “iceberg transport costs” taking
up an idea originated in von Thu¨nen (1930). Excellent surveys of this literature
(known under the heading of the new economic geography) are Fujita and Krug-
man (2004), Fujita et al. (2000), Neary (2001), Ottaviano and Thisse (2004) and
Schmutzler (1999). A usual interpretation of the iceberg transport cost in the so-
called New Economic Geography, is that it embodies information costs, institu-
3
tional and trade barriers, quality standards, and cultural and linguistic differences1,
in addition to the pure transport costs (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004; Fujita et al.,
1999).
A common technical feature of the iceberg and traditional transport technolo-
gies is that both give rise to a delivered price function convex with distance. How-
ever, empirical evidence points towards concave delivered price schemes rather
than convex with distance. This leads McCann (2005) to raise a warning against the
use of such transport costs functions to provide real-world insights as the properties
of such transport costs are largely implausible when compared with the available
empirical evidence. In this respect de Frutos et al. (2002) show that for any convex
transport cost function there exists a concave one such that the location-then-price
games induced by these functions are strategically equivalent. Our proposal also
overcomes McCann’s criticism as it is robust to concave and convex transport cost
functions.
A different approach to the use of iceberg transport cost functions follows
Krugman (1998) where the spatial iceberg assumption is considered as a pure tech-
nical device for avoiding the need to model a two-sector economy with a consump-
tion good industry and a transport industry. Following this line of reasoning, it can
be argued that the iceberg approach vis-a-vis the Hotelling approach in the mod-
eling of transport costs allows for an endogenous determination of the provision
of transportation services. Also, as the price of transportation per unit of distance
is assumed constant, implicitly it amounts to assume that the transport sector is
perfectly competitive. No empirical evidence supports such assumption. However,
as we will see, the technical simplicity of Hotelling analysis contrasts with the
complexity that the iceberg formulation introduces in the analysis.
We aim at providing a direct comparison of the “costs” and “benefits” of us-
ing both approaches in a common framework. Thus, we propose to study price
and location equilibria in a duopoly model a` la Hotelling where transport costs are
1This interpretation of the iceberg formulation of transport costs may not be very rigorous. The
iceberg formulation implies that transport cost are dependent of the price of the transported com-
modity. It is not always easy to establish the link between some of those arguments and the price of
the transported good.
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modeled in the iceberg tradition. In this sense we want to contribute to the debate
between the modeling of transport costs in the spatial location and price competi-
tion models and in the new economic geography tradition.
Section 2 introduces the concepts of melting function and melting rate associ-
ated with the iceberg transport technology. It also clarifies the difference induced
in demand as compared to the traditional modeling of transport costs.
To illustrate our point, in section 3 we propose a monopoly and a general melt-
ing function. By assuming away competition, we can concentrate in the conse-
quences of modeling transports costs in the iceberg fashion. Next, we apply our
analysis to particular specifications of the melting function. The driving force be-
hind the results is that under the iceberg formulation, transportation is done by
oligopolistic producers. Accordingly, transport costs represent a transfer of re-
sources to the firms, thus inducing a more elastic demand. Should producers be
perfectly competitive, under the iceberg formulation each unit would be sold at a
price equal to the marginal cost of production. The transport cost would be equal
to the production costs of the units of commodity lost in transportation (i.e. melted
away). Thus, there would not be any transfer of resources to the firms.
Section 4 extends the analysis with an illustration of the effects of the melting
function approach in a competitive framework defined by a symmetric duopoly. In
section 5 we perform a welfare analysis where we take into account the role of the
resources devoted to transportation in the agents’ optimization behavior. A section
with conclusion closes the paper.
2 Melting vs. Transport Costs.
Let δ be the distance between consumer x and a firm and let µ ∈ (0, 1) be a
constant positively linked to the melting rate per unit of distance.2 We denote by
M(δ;µ) the rate at which the commodity melts away per unit of distance. Given
M(δ ;µ) we have to distinguish between the demand an individual addresses to
2A detailed analysis of the properties of the iceberg transport cost functions is found in McCann
(2005).
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a firm from his consumption. Denote by q(δ;µ) the quantity of the commodity a
consumer located at a distance δ of the firm needs to buy to consume exactly one
unit of the good. With this notation, we can formally define the melting rate M as,
M(δ;µ) =
∂q
∂δ
1
q
.
Definition 1 (Generalized melting function). A generalized melting function, h(δ;µ),
specifies the additional demand addressed by an individual located at a distance δ
from the firm to be able to consume one unit of the commodity. It is given by,
h(δ;µ) = q(δ;µ)− 1, (1)
where
h(δ;µ) > 0,
∂h
∂δ
> 0,
∂h
∂µ
> 0,
∂2h
∂δ2
≥ 0, ∂
2h
∂µ2
≥ 0. (2)
Thus, the melting rate is given by,
M(δ;µ) =
∂h
∂δ
1
1 + h(δ;µ)
.
We could also think of specifying the melting as a function of the distance and the
amount of commodity transported. In this case we would have q(δ;µ)f(δ;µ)) =
q(δ;µ) − 1. However, we can rewrite this latter additional demand as the former
with h(δ;µ) =
f(δ;µ)
1− f(δ;µ) . Therefore, both cases are formally equivalent.
To ease a proper understanding of the role of the melting in the modeling,
Figure 1 illustrates the standard transportation cost and the melting function ap-
proaches.
Consider the standard spatial model with convex transport costs. The unit price
at distance δ of the firm is given by P (δ; t, p) = p+ tδα, where p denotes the unit
f.o.b. price and α > 1. Note that in this case an increase in p translates in exactly
the same way to all consumers, i.e. the impact is positive but independent of δ. This
situation is depicted in part (a) of Figure 1 for a firm located in a and consumers
located between 0 and L.
The price paid by a consumer located at a distance δ of the firm is given, ac-
cording to the proposed general melting function, by P (δ;µ, p) = p(1 + h(δ;µ)).
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Figure 1: Delivered prices in a spatial model.
We observe that the impact on P (δ;µ, p) of an increase in p now is a positive
function of δ. That is,
∂2P (δ;µ, p)
∂p∂δ
> 0. Also, P (δ;µ, p) is increasing with δ.
Generically, this situation is presented in part (b) of Figure 1.
In the standard spatial model, a decrease in price increases demand because
the demand is downward sloping with respect to price. When transport costs are
modeled in the iceberg fashion, a decrease in price has an additional effect on
demand. Demand increases not only because it is negatively related to the price but
because the extra quantity demanded (“transport cost”) is also cheaper. Although
both approaches are not directly comparable, we can illustrate one difference by
saying that the iceberg transport technology induces a more elastic demand system
than the traditional Hotelling model.
Note that production and transportation are two different activities with differ-
ent technologies. Although independent, they are linked through consumers’ gross
demand. Firms use the same technology to produce all units of the good. However,
the additional demand due to melting depends on the transport technology and not
on the production technology.
3 Analysis of Monopoly.
Consider a spatial market described by a line segment of length L. Consumers are
evenly distributed on the market with unit density. They are identical in all respects
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but for their location. A consumer is denoted by x ∈ [0, L]. All consumers have a
common reservation price p. Consumers adjust their demands so that, if positive,
they consume exactly one unit of the commodity.
There is a monopolist in the market located at a distance a from the left end
of the market. It produces a homogeneous product with a constant returns to scale
technology represented by a constant marginal cost c. Assume, without loss of
generality a ≤ L/2.
The assumptions on h(δ;µ) given by (2), imply that the demand addressed by
consumer x given by (1), is a symmetric and increasing function around the firm’s
location and convex in both δ and µ.
The consumers indifferent between buying one unit from the monopolist or
stay out of the market (denote them by z ∈ [0, a] and y ∈ [a, L]) are given by the
solution of the following equations:
p
(
1 + h(a− z;µ)) = p = p(1 + h(y − a;µ)). (3)
A direct inspection of (3), tells us that since
∂h
∂δ
> 0
a− z = y − a. (4)
In equilibrium, the consumers located at the extremes of the interval describing
the market covered by the monopolist must obtain no surplus.
If the monopolist charges a f.o.b. price p = p, it obtains zero demand re-
gardless of its location. For prices p < p, we can identify prices so that all the
market is covered, but it is also possible to identify prices leaving some consumers
unattended. In this case, for each of those prices there is a continuum of locations
yielding the same demand. Among them, there is always one such that the indiffer-
ent consumer x is located at zero. We can, thus, characterize the demand captured
by the monopolist by the set of consumers with its left bound at zero.
Demand addressed to the monopolist is given by,
D(p) =
∫ a
z
(
1 + h(a− w;µ))dw + ∫ y
a
(
1 + h(w − a;µ))dw
= 2(a− z) +H(a− z;µ) +H(y − a;µ)− 2H(0;µ),
8
where we have made use of (4) and H(δ;µ) =
∫
h(δ;µ)dδ. From (4) it follows
H(a− x;µ) = H(y − a;µ) so that
D(p) = 2(a− z +H(a− z;µ)−H(0;µ)). (5)
The price that makes the consumer located at zero indifferent between buying
the commodity or staying out of the market is,
p˜(a) =
p
1 + h(a;µ)
=
p
q(δ, µ)
. (6)
Evaluating firm’s profits at p˜(a), we obtain,
Π(a) = 2(p˜(a)− c)(a+H(a;µ)−H(0;µ)). (7)
Proposition 1. (i) The monopoly profit maximizing price is,
p˜(a) =
p
1 + h(a;µ)
.
(ii) A monopolist will cover all the market if, for all a ≤ L/2,(
1 + h(a;µ)
)2(1− c
p
(1 + h(a;µ))
) ≥ ∂h
∂δ
(a;µ)
(
a+H(a;µ)−H(0;µ)).
Among all these locations, profits are maximum at a = L/2.
Proof. From (7) we derive
∂Π(a)
∂a
= 2p
(
1−
∂h
∂δ
(a;µ)(a+H(a;µ)−H(0;µ))
(1 + h(a;µ))2
)
− 2c(1 + h(a;µ)), (8)
This first order condition (8) is strictly positive for all a < L/2, and is equal to
zero at a = L/2
As particular cases of melting functions consider the following:
Definition 2 (Melting with Quantity and Distance: MQD). We say that melting is
MQD when it is proportional to the product of the quantity bought and the distance
traveled. Formally:
q(δ;µ)− µδq(δ;µ) = 1 (9)
and h(δ;µ) = µδ1−µδ .
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Definition 3 (Melting with Distance: MD). We refer to MD melting as the situation
where the melting is proportional to a power (α) of the distance. Formally:
q(δ;µ)− µδα = 1 (10)
and h(δ;µ) = µδα.
Definition 4 (Krugman-Samuelson Melting: KSM). KSM is obtained wen the
melting rate is constant with h(δ;µ) = eµδ − 1 and
q(δ;µ) = eµδ (11)
As it is shown in Proposition 1 the greater p/c, the more likely will the mo-
nopolist locate at a = L2 and cover all the market. In the following Corollary we
analyze the intensity of the preference of the monopolist for covering the market
when c = 0 in the particular melting functions introduced in definitions 2 to 4.3
Corollary 1. (i) Under MQD, the monopolist covers the whole market4 and
locates at its center iff
L
2
≤ e− 1
eµ
(ii) Under MD, the monopolist locates at the center and covers all the market if
α ≤ 2.
(iii) Under KSM, the monopolist locates at the center and covers all the market.
Proof. See appendix
4 Melting in oligopolistic markets
We now extend our analysis to the case of oligopolistic markets. We intend to
illustrate the effect of the iceberg transport approach in the study of oligopoly. We
retain the same model as in the monopoly case, but now we introduce competition
between two identical firms. We characterize transport costs by a MD-type melting
3Note that under MQD we have p˜(L
2
) > 0 ⇔ µL < 2. Hence, when µL > 2 coverage of
the whole market is not feasible. However, under MD or under Samuelson melting coverage of the
whole market is always feasible.
4Note that µL < 2 is a necessary condition to obtain full market coverage by the monopolist.
Note also that µL ≤ 2(e− 1)/e ≈ 1.264 is a more stringent condition for full market coverage.
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function. We assume that first firms decide simultaneously their locations and then,
they compete in prices by selecting simultaneously their mill prices.
To be precise, we introduce first the necessary notation.
Let L = 1 without loss of generality. Two firms a, and b are located at points
a and b where a ∈ [0, b). Let pa and pb denote their respective prices, and p¯ the
common reservation price for consumers. We assume p¯ to be high enough (but
finite) so that all consumers can afford purchasing from one of the firms (in other
words, the market is fully covered). Let α = 1 in the MD melting function5 and
µ > 0. Under the MD regime, the price paid by a consumer located at a distance δ
from firm i is given by pi(1 + µδ).
4.1 Indifferent consumers
To construct the contingent demand system, we will distinguish three regions in
the market and define their corresponding indifferent consumers. A first region is
given by the segment [0, a]. Denote an indifferent consumer in that region as x1.
The second region is the segment [a, b], ant the corresponding indifferent consumer
will be denoted as x2. Finally, the interval [b, 1] describes the third region and x3
denotes its indifferent consumer.
Indifferent consumer x1. A consumer in [0, a] is indifferent between patronizing
either firm if
pa(1 + µ(a− x)) = pb(1 + µ(b− x))
or
x1(pa, pb; a, b) =
pb(1 + µb)− pa(1 + µa)
µ(pb − pa) ∈ [0, a] (12)
Note that firm b may only capture consumers in firm a’s hinterland if pb <
pa. In turn, this implies that the denominator of (12) is negative. Therefore,
x1 is well-defined only if the numerator is also negative.
5We can develop the analysis for a concave transport function taking for instance α = 1/2
with analogous results. Namely, the firm quoting the lower price would be able to capture a non-
connected market share. In this respect our analysis is robust to McCann (2005) criticisms. Note
also that α = 1/2 corresponds to the transport cost function proposed in McCann (1993, 1998).
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Indifferent consumer x2. A consumer in [a, b] is indifferent between patronizing
either firm if
pa(1 + µ(x− a)) = pb(1 + µ(b− x))
or
x2(pa, pb; a, b) =
pb(1 + µb)− pa(1− µa)
µ(pb + pa)
∈ [a, b] (13)
Indifferent consumer x3. A consumer in [b, 1] is indifferent between patronizing
either firm if
pa(1 + µ(x− a)) = pb(1 + µ(x− b))
or
x3(pa, pb; a, b) =
−pb(1− µb) + pa(1− µa)
µ(pb − pa) ∈ [b, 1] (14)
Note that firm a may only capture consumers in firm b’s hinterland if pa <
pb.
To easy notation we will refer to the indifferent consumers as x1, x2, x3 when
such notation will not induce confusion.
Remark 1. Note that indifferent consumer functions are continuous at a and b.
That is,
x1|a = x2|a and x2|b = x3|b.
4.2 Firm a’s contingent demand
Before computing the contingent demand captured by firm a, let us identify four
critical prices.
Firm a will capture no demand at all when, given a certain price pb of firm b,
firm a calls a price pa such that x1 = a. Naturally, for even higher prices firm a
will remain inactive in the market. Let us denote such price as pmaxa . Its expression
is given by the solution of x1 = a, i.e.
pmaxa = pb(1 + µ(b− a)). (15)
Figure 2 illustrates this scenario.
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pb
pmaxa
0 1ba
Figure 2: Firm a captures no demand.
pb
pˆa
0 1ba x2
Figure 3: Firm a captures its hinterland.
As firm a lowers the price, it starts capturing consumers in the neighborhood of
its location a. Firm a captures all consumers in its hinterland when, given a certain
price pb of firm b, firm a calls a price pa such that x1 = 0. Let us denote such price
as pˆa. It is given by,
pˆa = pb
1 + µb
1 + µa
. (16)
Note that pˆa > pb. Figure 3 illustrates.
Further reductions of the price, allows to increase demand from consumers
located to the right to a. Also, at a price p˜a (given pb), firm a will start to capture
consumers in the hinterland of firm b. This price is given by the solution of x3 = 1,
and its expression is,
p˜a = pb
1 + µ(1− b)
1 + µ(1− a) . (17)
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pb
p˜a
0 1ba x2
Figure 4: Firm a’s demand at p˜a.
pb
0 1ba
pmina
Figure 5: Firm a captures all the market.
Note that, p˜a < pb. Figure 4 illustrates.
Finally, firm a captures all consumers in the market when, given a certain price
pb of firm b, firm a calls a price pa such that x3 = b. Naturally, for even lower
prices firm a’s demand will not expand as all consumers are already patronizing it.
Let us denote such price as pmina . Its expression is given by the solution of x3 = 1,
i.e.
pmina = pb
1
1 + µ(b− a) . (18)
Figure 5 illustrates.
To construct the (contingent) demand of firm a, lets us start by assuming that
it quotes a price pa ≥ pmaxa . Then,
Da(pa, pb) = 0, if pa ≥ pmaxa
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Figure 6: Constructing firm a’s contingent demand.
For prices below pmaxa , firm a starts capturing consumers on both sides. At pˆa,
it will capture all consumers in [0, a] (and, of course some more consumers to its
right). Therefore, the demand function in this domain of prices will be,
Da(pa, pb) =
∫ a
x1
(1 + µ(a− s))ds+
∫ x2
a
(1 + µ(s− a))ds, if pmaxa ≥ pa ≥ pˆa.
As firm a quotes prices lower than pˆa its demand expands from its right hand
side in [a, b] only up to the price p˜a. Therefore, for prices until p˜a demand is given
by,
Da(pa, pb) =
∫ a
0
(1 + µ(a− s))ds+
∫ x2
a
(1 + µ(s− a))ds, if pˆa ≥ pa ≥ p˜a.
From this point, lower prices allows firm a to start stealing consumers in firm b’s
hinterland, so that its demand will be given by
Da(pa, pb) =
∫ a
0
(1+µ(a−s))ds+
∫ x2
a
(1+µ(s−a))ds+
∫ 1
x3
(1+µ(s−a))ds, if p˜a ≥ pa ≥ pmina .
At pmina firm a captures all the market, so that further reductions of its price does
not contribute any revenues. Thus,
Da(pa, pb) =
∫ a
0
(1 + µ(a− s))ds+
∫ 1
a
(1 + µ(s− a))ds, if pa ≤ pmina
Figure 6 summarizes the discussion.
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Formally, the contingent demand of firm a is,
Da(pa, pb) =

0, if pa ≥ pmaxa∫ a
x1
(1 + µ(a− s))ds+ ∫ x2a (1 + µ(s− a))ds, if pmaxa ≥ pa ≥ pˆa∫ a
0 (1 + µ(a− s))ds+
∫ x2
a (1 + µ(s− a))ds, if pˆa ≥ pa ≥ p˜a∫ a
0 (1 + µ(a− s))ds+
∫ x2
a (1 + µ(s− a))ds
+
∫ x3
b (1 + µ(s− a))ds, if p˜a ≥ pa ≥ pmina∫ a
0 (1 + µ(a− s))ds+
∫ 1
a (1 + µ(s− a))ds, if pmina ≥ pa
(19)
It is straightforward to verify the continuity of this contingent demand from the
continuity of the indifferent consumer functions (see remark 1).
5 Characterizing a symmetric price equilibrium
Given the demand function just identified, if a symmetric equilibrium exists, it
must lie in the domain of prices (pˆa, p˜a). In this domain, the relevant piece of the
demand function is,
Da(pa, pb) =
∫ a
0
(1 + µ(a− s))ds+
∫ x2
a
(1 + µ(s− a))ds, if pˆa ≥ pa ≥ p˜a.
or
Da(pa, pb) = a+
a2µ
2
− (pa + (−1 + aµ− bµ)pb)(pa + (3− aµ+ bµ)pb)
2µ(pa + pb)2
(20)
Assuming without loss of generality that marginal production costs are constant
and denoted by c > 0 for both firms, firm a’s profits in the domain of prices
relevant to the analysis are
Πa(pa, pb) = (pa − c)Da(pa, pb)
= (pa − c)
(
a+
a2µ
2
− (pa + (−1 + aµ− bµ)pb)(pa + (3− aµ+ bµ)pb)
2µ(pa + pb)2
)
The first order condition is given by
∂Πa
∂pa
=
1
2µ(pa + pb)3
(
(p3a + 3p
2
apb)(a
2µ2 + 2aµ− 1)
+ pap2b(2a
2µ2 + 2aµ(5 + bµ)− b2µ2 − 4bµ− 7)
+ p2b(2− aµ+ bµ)2c+ p3b(2a2µ2 − 2aµ(1 + bµ) + b2µ2 + 4bµ+ 3)
)
(21)
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Let us characterize a symmetric equilibrium in prices, pb = pa. Then, expres-
sion (21) simplifies to
∂Πa
∂pa
∣∣∣
pb=pa
=
c(2− aµ+ bµ)2
8paµ
+
a2µ2 + 2aµ− 1
2µ
,
so that the (candidate) equilibrium price is
p∗ = c
(2− aµ+ bµ)2
4(1− 2aµ− a2µ2) (22)
Remark 2. The (candidate) symmetric equilibrium price is above the marginal
cost c.
Note that
(2− aµ+ bµ)2
4(1− 2aµ− a2µ2) > 1⇐⇒ 4µ(a+ b) + 4a
2µ2 + µ2(b− a)2 > 0
that is always verified.
Also, the symmetric candidate equilibrium price is well-defined if the denomi-
nator of (22) is positive.
Remark 3.
1− 2aµ− a2µ2 > 0 ⇐⇒ aµ <
√
2− 1 (23)
A sufficient condition to satisfy the condition in (23) for all values of a ∈ [0, 1]
is
µ <
√
2− 1.
Summarizing the discussion, we can state the following result,
Proposition 2. Let µ <
√
2 − 1. Then, there exists a unique symmetric price
equilibrium. It is given by
p∗ = c
(2− aµ+ bµ)2
4(1− 2aµ− a2µ2) .
Note incidentally, that p∗ is increasing in µ.
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6 Location
We now tackle the first stage of the overall game dealing with the location choice of
the firms. By substituting the symmetric equilibrium price (22), into the profit func-
tions, we can express profits in terms of the location parameters a and b. Firm a’s
demand evaluated at the equilibrium price, using (5) becomes
Da(a, b) =
5a2µ+ 2a(2− bµ) + b(4 + bµ)
8
.
Also,
p− c = cµ
(5a2µ+ 2a(2− bµ) + b(4 + bµ)
4(1− 2aµ− a2µ2)
)
, (24)
so that firm a’s profits in the location (sub)game are given by
Πa(a, b) =
cµ(5a2µ+ 2a(2− bµ) + b(4 + bµ))2
32(1− 2aµ− a2µ2) (25)
The first order condition after some simplifications can be written as
∂Πa
∂a
=
cµ(5a2µ+ 2a(2− bµ) + b(4 + bµ))Λ(a, b)
16(1− 2aµ+ a2µ2)2
where
Λ(a, b) = 4 + 2bµ+ b2µ2 − 15a2µ2 − 5a3µ3 + aµ(6 + 6bµ+ b2µ2)
Note that Λ(a, b) > 0, because given the restrictions on a and µ it follows that
6aµ > 5a3µ3, and
4 + 2bµ+ b2µ2 + aµ(6bµ+ b2µ2) > 15a2µ2
Using (24), we can write the first order condition as
∂Πa
∂a
=
(p− c)Λ(a, b)
4(1− 2aµ+ a2µ2) .
The sign of this derivative is always positive. Therefore,
Proposition 3. The symmetric equilibrium price induces a symmetric location
around the center of the market.
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7 Conclusion
Address models of differentiation are characterized by the exogeneity of the trans-
port cost function. Implicitly, this amounts to assume that transport services are
delivered under perfectly competitive conditions. However, the market of trans-
portation often is oligopolistic. Also there are markets where transport costs are
dependent on demand such as the supply of electricity, or water. We propose to
approach this issue by using an iceberg transport cost technology. We show that
the iceberg transport technology induces a more elastic demand system than the
traditional Hotelling model. We propose to study price and location equilibria in
a duopoly model a` la Hotelling where transport costs are modeled in the iceberg
fashion. In this sense we want to contribute to the debate between the modeling
of transport costs in the spatial location and price competition models and in the
new economic geography tradition. We characterize a symmetric price equilibrium
when melting is proportional to a power of distance. Then we show that a symmet-
ric equilibrium price induces a symmetric location around the center of the market,
thus reproducing the principle of minimum differentiation.
We argue that our analysis is robust to both concave and convex transport cost
functions. Also, it is easy to extend our analysis considering melting and traditional
transport cost functions together. In this sense, we could capture a competitive
transport market and a quality dimension by which higher quality products convey
higher transport costs. In other words, we would model the delivered price as
the combination of an ad valorem and a per unit component. An example of this
modeling could be p(1+µδα)+tδ. Note that this formulation implies that the slope
of the delivered price function increases in an amount equal to the transport cost
per unit of distance. Accordingly, our qualitative results would remain unchanged.
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Appendix
Proof of Corollary 1
i) Under MQD melting we have:
∂h(δ, µ)
∂δ
=
µ
(1− µδ)2
and
H(δ, µ) =
1
µ
(−µδ − ln(1− µδ)).
Hence,
(1 + h(a, µ))2 =
1
(1− µa)2
and
∂h(a, µ)
∂δ
(a+H(a, µ)−H(0, µ)) = − ln(1− µa)
(1− µa)2 .
As ln(1− µa) < 0 and d ln(1− µa)
da
< 0, if expression (8) in Proposition 1
holds for a = L2 , it will also hold for a <
L
2 .
Given that
1
(1− µL2 )2
>
− ln(1− µL2 )
(1− µL2 )2
⇔ e > 1
1− µL2
⇔ 2e− 1
eµ
> L,
we obtain, from Proposition 1, the result.
ii) Under MD melting we have:
∂h(δ, µ)
∂δ
= µαδα−1
and
H(δ, µ) =
µδα+1
α+ 1
.
Hence, as
(1 + h(a, µ))2 = 1 + 2µaα + µ2a2α
and
∂h(a, µ)
∂δ
(a+H(a, µ)−H(0, µ)) = αµaα + α
α+ 1
µ2a2α,
the inequality (8) in Proposition 1 holds for α ≤ 2. Accordingly, for α ≤ 2
the monopolist locates at the center and covers all the market.
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iii) Under Samuelson melting we have:
∂h(δ, µ)
∂δ
= µeµδ
and
H(δ, µ) =
eµδ
µ
− δ.
Hence, given that
(1 + h(a, µ))2 = e2µa
and
∂h(a, µ)
∂δ
.(a+H(a, µ)−H(0, µ)) = e2µa − eµa,
from Proposition 1 we obtain that the monopolist locates at the center and
covers all the market. 
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